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A DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Mark D. Linville

The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said
that that doctrine is "speciesist to the core" and "the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics." Those of us who would defend the view that humans
enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the
question, "What's so special about humans?" In this paper, I argue that moral
agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer.

I

Renaissance humanism never had a more enthusiastic spokesperson than
the young intellectual, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494).
According to Pico, "Man is the most fortunate creature and thus worthy of
all admiration." He is "to be envied not only by the beasts, but also by the
stars, and the Intelligences beyond this world." "To him it was granted to
have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills. " I Pico was seldom
known for restraint in his intellectual endeavors, and he may have allowed
himself to get a little carried away. Indeed, Pope Innocent VIII-a human
himself-suggested that Pico tone things down a bit. What this precocious
young Florentine professed on paper, a younger Florentine contemporary
would say just a few years later in marble. Michelangelo'S David also
bespeaks the dignity and greatness of man. Those were the days.
Humanism has come in for a great deal of criticism in these twilight
hours of the twentieth century. In the view of some writers, Pico's praise
for his fellow humans is the moral equivalent of the white supremacist's
celebration of his fellow Caucasoids. In particular, environmentalists and
animalliberationists have been keen to point out that such favoritism for
those of one's own species is, at best, unjustified and probably just downright immoral. James Rachels regards the traditional doctrine of human
dignity as "the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics." 2 Worse,
that doctrine is "speciesist to the core." 3 One earns the designation
speciesist in the event that one bebeves that membership in one's own
species is sufficient justification for preferential treatment of conspecifics.
Peter Singer, James Rachels, Tom Regan, Paul Taylor and a host of other
contemporary writers have variously argued that there is no objective criterion in virtue of which we may assign humans a greater worth than their
nonhuman neighbors. In short: we humans are nothing special!
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Indeed, some have come to view the human species as a kind of blight
upon the earth. Consider Edward Abbey's well-known quip that he
would "sooner shoot a man than a snake."s And the Church of Euthanasia
offers this counsel: "Save the planet: Kill yourself." Rigor mortis is the cardinal virtue to be cultivated according to the teachings of this sect.
Immediate sainthood awaits any devotee who is willing to become cardinally virtuous and thus help to decrease the surplus population.6 Paul
Taylor suggests that, while we most certainly need our natural environment, it has no need of us. In fact, he muses that, were homo sapiens to go
the way of the dodo, our fellow creatures would likely greet this event
"with a hearty 'Good riddance!"'7
II

My present aim is to defend the traditional doctrine of human dignity,
which I understand as the belief that humans enjoy a special worth and
moral standings that is unequaled by the rest of the natural order. I shall
argue that there are certain uniquely human characteristics or properties in
virtue of which humans may be said to possess a greater worth than that of
nonhuman earthly creatures.9
Of course, the claim that humans possess special value-conferring properties is nothing new. For instance, Aristotle observed that it is our rationality that makes us unique, and the Western tradition has been something
like a footnote to Aristotle in taking this uniqueness to imply special standing. Or, alternatively, consider Thomas Huxley's reason for denying that
Darwin's theory undermined the doctrine of human dignity.
Our reverence for the nobility of manhood will not be lessened by the
knowledge that Man is, in substance and structure, one with the
brutes; for he alone possesses the marvelous endowment of intelligible
and rational speech, whereby, in the secular period of his existence, he
has slowly accumulated and organised the experience which is almost
wholly lost with the cessation of every individual life in other animals;
so that, now, he stands raised upon it as a mountain top, far above the
level of his humble fellows, and transfigured from his grosser nature
by reflecting, here and there, a ray from the infinite source of truth. IO
More recently, Daniel Dennett at least hints in this direction. On the one
hand, persons are merely primates that have come to be "infested" with
"memes"-Richard Dawkins' name for any unit of cultural evolution. But on
the other hand, he insists that "there is a huge difference between our minds
and the minds of other species, a gulf wide enough to make even a moral
difference. "II
Beyond traditional appeals to human intelligence and linguistic capacities, there is the claim that man alone has the capacity to understand and
act upon moral principle and that this is the basis of human dignity. If the
immensity of the starry heavens above me seems to diminish my worth
and significance, the moral law within me has the reverse effect. The
Kantian doctrine of human dignity is rooted in human moral agencyY
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Those critical of the humanistic tradition sometimes observe that
humans are not, in fact, the only creatures who enjoy rational, linguistic or
moral capacities. Chimpanzees use tools, gorillas learn sign language and
elephants weep, we are told. Others challenge the assumption that such
differences are of any moral relevance. Peter Singer considers such appeals
in the context of racism. Consider the white supremacist who maintains
that the average Caucasian has an I.Q. higher than that of the average
Mrican American, and that this difference justifies differential treatment.
What should be the main line of defense from people of good will? Should
we argue that no such differences exist and trust that the best empirical
studies will bear us out? Singer thinks not.
Fortunately there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of a scientific investigation. The appropriate response
to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically based differences in ability among the races or between the sexes is not to stick
to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever
evidence to the contrary may turn up; instead we should make it
quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence,
moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality
is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. . .. The principle of the equality
of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equali~ among
humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings)
Of course, Singer is out to apply the principle of equality interspecifically,
and so he draws on the support of the imperishable Jeremy Bentham: "The
question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?"14
Not just any difference counts as a morally relevant difference.
III

It is along similar lines that Paul Taylor argues for the irrelevance of all
such human singularities. His argument poses a direct challenge to the
thesis of this paper, and so the following discussion will devote considerable attention to that challenge and seek to formulate a reply.
Taylor considers a number of unique human characteristics, such as
rationality and autonomy, as the grounds for supposing that humans are
of greater value than nonhumans. Taylor responds to such suggestions
with a general question: "Valuable to whom and for what reason?"15 As he
observes, the characteristics that are typically suggested are certainly of
great value, but it is a relative value. That is, these uniquely human characteristics may well be of supreme value to humans because they serve as efficient means to uniquely human ends. But other species excel at other
things. Consider the flight of the falcon or the tree-climbing capabilities of
the monkey. It is certainly true that monkeys have no great aptitude for
mathematics. But I have yet to meet a monkey who was concerned to correct this deficit. And few mathematicians are particularly keen at arboreal
acrobatics. Each has his forte. Why suppose that either area of competence
renders the one superior to the other? As Taylor sees it, all such arguments
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are guilty of special pleading.
To use only standards based on the good of humans is already to
commit oneself to holding that the good of humans counts more
than, or is more worthy of consideration than, the good of nonhumans, which is the point in question. In
Taylor thus offers a species-relative theory of value that resembles more
familiar varieties of relativism in interesting ways. The cultural relativist
insists that there can be no valid cross-cultural moral judgments precisely
because there is no culture-neutral standpoint from which one might judge
that some cultures are morally preferable to others. The various cultures
are "traveling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, and these
ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of
another society, because essentially they are incommensurable."!7
Similarly, Taylor asks, "From what point of view are they [human characteristics] judged to be signs of superiority, and on what grounds?" To
judge that people are better than penguins because we can reason and they
cannot is to appeal to a criterion that has no valid application beyond the
boundaries of our own species. Penguin ends and penguin means are simply different from the ends and means of people. Penguins cannot play
chess or build cathedrals. But this observation tells us little more than that
penguins are not people. So what else is new?
This pattern of argument characterizes Taylor's critique of the traditional mainstream defenses of humanism. Consider the Aristotelian tradition mentioned earlier, which maintains that humans are essentially
rational animals and that it is in virtue of their rationality that they are
set apart from the brutes. Taylor replies, "Even if we were to accept this
essentialist conception of human nature and human well-being, nothing
follows from it concerning other organisms."'8 Given this conception
of human nature, we may well appeal to rationality as a criterion for
determining whether any individual human is a good of its kind, but
nothing follows about the relative values or moral standing of humans
and nonhumans. We may be able to say with Mill that it is indeed better
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, but we have not found
here the resources for going on with him to say that it is better to be a
human than a pig.!9
The challenge, then, is to discover some property that is uniquely
human and qualifies its bearer for greater moral standing than those who
lack it. Let us call such a property a great- making property. Taylor has
observed that two resembling properties are sometimes confused, and that
this confusion is at the root of historical and influential defenses of humanism. Let us distinguish great-making properties from what I shall call

excellence properties. 20
(EP)

S has an excellence property if and only if S is a member of
kind K and S has a property P such that for all x and all y, if x
and yare members of K, and x has P and y lacks P, then x is
a better instance of K than is y.
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(GMP) S has a great-making property if and only if S possess a
property P such that for all x and y, if x has P and y lacks P,
then x is greater (of greater value) than y.
Taylor has maintained, in effect, that the only good sense that can be made
of the "is better than" clause in (GMP) is one that is kind-specific-as we
have in (EP).2! And so every meaningful instance of (GMP) may be translated without remainder into some instance of (EP). The fact that, say,
Calvin admirably meets the criterion set at (EP) gives us no grounds for
preferring him over Hobbes, who may meet that criterion equally well
after his kind. 22
It appears that Taylor is in the business of ruling out apriori the very possibility of there being genuine great-making properties as we understand
them. And this seems to be from the very nature of the case. A property
will not be a plausible candidate for conferring human superiority unless it
is possessed solely by humans. But Taylor's logic turns that very uniqueness against the humanist: other creatures do not have the property (or do
not have it to the degree that humans do) and therefore do not need or
value it. It is thus valuable only from a human perspective, and so the
humanist assumes precisely what she attempts to prove.
IV

How shall we reply to Taylor'S argument? We might begin by observing that, interestingly, if it is effective in ruling out human superiority, it
would seem to work equally well at persuading God to walk humbly with
himself. For whatever divine attributes were once thought to be greatmaking properties (logically maximal power, knowledge and goodness,
for example) may well be necessary for God to be God, but we humans
seem to get on quite well without them. Deep gratitude to God may be
appropriate, but insofar as the worship of God entails ascribing exclusive
worth to Him,23 God is simply out of line if he demands our worship.
Indeed, sparrows that are sold two for a farthing, do not need divine attributes any more than they need any uniquely human characteristics. We
would thus be mistaken if we supposed that God is of more value than
sparrows. Many of us, believers and unbelievers alike, think it reasonable
to believe that if there is a being such as God then he is deserving of our
worship. Taylor'S argument seems to have the effect of showing that the
otherwise coherent concept of worship is, in fact, incoherent. While it may
be true that one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens,
one might take this result as a sign that Taylor hath proven too much. 24
And one might wonder whether human rationality is valuable only
from a human perspective, as Taylor maintains. As we have seen, he has
suggested on several occasions that we look at things from the perspective
of non-human living things. This is to have the effect of showing us the
merely relative value of things human. Thus, in reply to the cartesian
argument that only humans possess minds, Taylor observes that bears
don't need minds. 25 But a mind can be a very handy thing when battling
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blazes to save bears. I suspect that if bears did have minds they would
agree26 • And if, say, a pair of antediluvian penguins could think and
speak, they might have thanked their lucky stars that the earth included a
creature with the rational wherewithal to follow a blueprint.
Further, and closer to the point of this essay, even if we were to grant
that individual human characteristics and capacities such as rationality and
autonomy are not, by themselves, great-making, one might yet go on to
argue that such properties are essential components of a more complex
great-making property. Consider human moral agency. Arguably, all
moral agents are rational and autonomous. And so a successful argument
establishing that moral agency is a great-making property will affect our
assessment of these properties as well. 27
Is there a successful argument from moral agency? As I indicated earlier, one traditional argument for human superiority is grounded in the
observation that humans appear to be the only moral agents who grace the
planet. It is on this point that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason came
as close as ever to poetic expression.
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration
and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry
heavens above me and the moral law within me. . .. The former
view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my
importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet
(a mere speck of the universe) the matter from which it came, the
matter which is for a little time provided with vital force, we know
not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as
that of an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law
reveals a life independent of all animality and even of the whole
world of sense ....2B
The clear implication of Kant's remarks is that, but for the moral law within,
our importance would be annihilated by the sheer immensity of the cosmos.
We have no good reason to suppose that our fellow earthly creatures also
carry the moral law within them. And so, while our own worth is infinitely
raised, they would appear to be, shall we say, "axiologically challenged."
Kant thus seemed to believe that moral agency is a great-making property
in the sense that we have specified.
We have yet to consider Taylor'S reply to the argument for human superiority from moral agency. Though we might expect that his remarks concerning the merely instrumental and relative value of rationality and language
apply with equal force to moral agency, this is not the case. When Taylor
turns to the sort of tradition that is represented by Kant's famous passage, he
adopts an entirely different strategy. He takes that tradition to be asserting
that "we humans are morally superior beings because we possess, while animals and plants lack, the capacities that give us the status of moral agents."29
Rather than argue for the relative value of human moral agency, Taylor
charges that this argument rests on a fundamental confusion.
There is a serious confusion of thought in this line of reasoning if the
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conclusion drawn is understood as asserting that humans are morally superior to nonhumans. One cannot validly argue that humans
are morally superior beings on the ground that they possess, while
others lack, the capacities of a moral agent. The reason is that, as far
as moral standards are concerned, only beings that have the capacities of a moral agent can meaningfully be said to be either morally
good or morally bad. Only moral agents can be judged to be morally
better or worse than others, and the others in question must be moral
agents themselves. 30
Suppose, then, that we refer to the view under consideration as the belief
in human moral superiority and allow that it may be represented as follows:
(MS) Humans are morally superior to nonhumans.
Taylor reads (MS) as having the following import:
(MSl) Humans are the "moral betters" of nonhumans
where "x is the moral better of y" means, roughly, "x is more virtuous than
y." Taylor is certainly correct in observing that, on this reading, it is not
quite correct to say that (MS) is false. Rather, it is just woefully confused.
We might as well point out that Porsches accelerate faster than pianos and
that alligators are fiercer than artichokes. The obvious point in all of this is
that, in each comparison, a kind of category mistake is committed. Pianos
and artichokes are neither fierce nor fast because they are not the kinds of
things to which we can meaningfully ascribe these predicates.
But (MSl) is neither a plausible nor a natural reading of (MS). Taylor
himself states the traditional argument for human moral superiority: "Such
capacities as free will, accountability, deliberation and practical reason, it is
said, endow us with the special nobility and dignity that belong only to
responsible beings."3! The claim that humans are "morally superior to
nonhumans" is simply an awkward wa~2 of saying that our moral capacities amount to great- making properties, and this is best expressed along
the following lines.
(MS2)

Individuals with moral capacities are of greater inherent
worth than individuals lacking such capacities.

It is somewhat puzzling that Taylor should choose this way of criticizing
the traditional argument from moral agency because, in addition to stating
the view in a way that is best represented by (MS2), he interacts with a contemporary author who clearly argues for that proposition.33 But it seems to
me that Taylor has splendid reasons for not attempting to dismiss the value
of moral agency by means of the relativity argument that we have considered above. For this would be to maintain that morality and moral capacities, like rational and linguistic capacities, are of merely instrumental value as
they serve uniquely human interests. On such a view, moral values are
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subordinated to non-moral values, and morality becomes a system of hypothetical imperatives: rules telling us what we must do in order to accomplish certain ends that we happen to hold, as individuals or as a species.
It is no mere coincidence that Kant identified t·wo sorts of things that
have dignity rather than a mere price: human persons and the moral law
itself.34 Kant saw that genuine respect for persons requires respect for the
law. My respecting you calls for my acting for the sake of certain direct
duties to you. I should respect you because it is the right thing to do; and it
is the right thing to do because you are deserving of respect. If, however,
my fair treatment of you is only a happy by-product of my looking after
my own interests or seeking my own ends, then I am merely acting in
accordance with those duties owed you. This is to behave as though I
have, at best, certain duties regarding you, and such behavior hardly qualifies as respect. It seems to me that these observations apply in the present
context. If our moral nature has merely instrumental value, in that it
serves uniquely human ends, then human moral behavior is not directed
to nonhuman individuals as ends-in-themselves. Neither Taylor nor anyone who challenges the doctrine of human dignity on moral grounds is in a
position to limit the significance of human morality to human ends and
human interactions, for the very project of contending for the equal standing and value of nonhuman life is a moral one. In sum, if human morality
is of merely relative and instrumental value from a human standpoint,
then any acceptable environmental ethic will be an ethic grounded in a
kind of enlightened anthropocentrism: if ethics is a means to human ends
then so is environmental ethics. It seems, then, that Taylor himself offers
us a theory that requires the dignity or inherent worth of morality itself.35

v
Consider again our revised statement of the thesis of human moral
superiority:
(MS2)

Individuals with moral capacities are of greater inherent
worth than individuals lacking such capacities.

In the spirit of Taylor'S discussion we may ask "From what point of view

are moral agents judged to be of greater worth?" Taylor's discussion has
served to sharpen our focus so that we now know precisely what it is that
is needed: a uniquely human property that is not merely an excellence property but is also great-making. And if there are any great-making properties
then there is an impartial-indeed, an all-encompassing-point of view
from which they are so highly esteemed.
Further, the resulting value must not be merely instrumental since we
have no reason to suppose that instrumental value is sufficient for establishing inherent worth. 36 Thus, it will not be enough to point out that moral
agency is valuable to someone or something for some purpose. We seek
grounds for making the claim that it is a good thing that there are moral agents
in such a way that it is not reducible to a description of the evaluative preferences of some individual or group in the way that it is a good thing that
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there are chocolate chip cookies is reducible to a description of my own preferences. What point of view might provide us with such grounds if it is not
that of humans, bears or penguins? How about the moral point of view?
To see this, suppose we restate the claim made at (MS2) in terms of the
relative values of possible worlds. And let us think of great-making properties from a slightly different perspective. A property is great-making if it is
world-enhancing. And a property is world- enhancing if a world in which it
is instantiated is, all other things being equal, that much the richer. Thus,
our claim at (MS2) may be expressed as the following:
(MS3)

For any two possible worlds wand w*, if w includes moral
agents and w* lacks moral agents, then, all other things being
equal, w is of greater value than w*.

(MS3) maintains that moral agency is a world-enhancing property.
Of course, (MS3) is no more impressive than (MS2). But imagine God
deliberating over which world he will make actual. Presumably, some
worlds will be more worthy of God's election than others. Consider two of
God's options. In WI, God creates the heavens and the earth. The light is
separated from the darkness. The earth brings forth vegetation. But the
story of creation ends somewhere around verse 13. When trees fall in the
forests of WI there is no one there to hear them. And, alas, the ocean
waves of WI are forever unridden. But among the propositions included
in W2 are all of those represented in the entire first chapter of Genesis. W2
includes moral agents with the ability to choose for good or ill. The suggestion under consideration is that, all other things being equal, W2 is
more worthy of God's choice than Wl.
This may appear to be an instance of special pleading of the worst kind.
One may be tempted to suggest, politely or otherwise, that the God of this
story bears the imago hominis. That is, the suspicion may be that we have
merely projected our own human-centered prejudices into the heavens and
accorded them divine sanction. But in asking which worlds are worthy of
God's choice, we are asking which worlds would likely be chosen by a being
of the nature that God has traditionally been thought to have. And it is primarily God's moral nature that we have in mind in raising this question. The
suggestion is that in virtue of his capacity as a perfectly good being, some
worlds are more worthy of election than others. In this way, at least for present purposes, we might think of God as morality personified. We are asking, therefore, which worlds are better given the moral point of view.
Why suppose that moral agency is a world-enhancing property? Why
think that a world with moral agents is of any greater value than one without? I suggest that this is because there is a necessary connection between
moral agency and moral values. With this in mind, one might urge the
claim that worlds without moral agents are equally impoverished with
respect to moral values. On this view, worlds that include nothing but, say,
penguins or elm trees or washing machines are morally neutral. There is a
range of core moral values that are impossible to attain without the presence of moral agents. A world inhabited only by penguins or elm trees is a
world that excludes moral goodness (or evil), rightness (or wrongness) or
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any of the virtues or vices. This consideration arises in the context of certain
theodicies in which it is argued that genuine moral agency is a necessary
condition of a world's producing moral goodness. The suggestion in that
context, of course, is that that same moral agency has also made possible a
great deal of moral evil. The backbone of this theodicy is found in the claim
that it was good-morally good- of God to have created a world capable of
producing moral goodness or creatures of good will.
We have identified the moral point of view as the standpoint from
which to judge the relative worth of beings. There are, to be sure, other
perspectives from which one may proffer value judgments. For example, I
happen to think that bald eagles are more beautiful than bald heads so that
the former are of greater aesthetic value than the latter. Further, some
philosophers have maintained that beauty has inherent worth. 37 If they are
right, then we must allow that not all judgments of inherent worth are
made from the moral point of view. But, even if there are valid nonmoral
judgments of inherent worth, the moral point of view is presupposed in
the present discussion. It is precisely from the moral standpoint that the
doctrine of human dignity is either challenged or defended. To observe
that, say, stunning plumage is of greater value than moral agency from an
aesthetic point of view is just to imply that some birds are more beautiful
than moral agents. But I do not deny this. That the hummingbirds in my
back yard are more interesting to look at than the sleeping student in the
back row of my classroom is perfectly consistent with the latter enjoying
greater moral standing than the former. The insights of the aesthetic point
of view do not, of themselves, challenge the argument of this paper. To
maintain that objects of beauty deserve moral standing that is equal to or
greater than that enjoyed by moral agents would indeed propose a challenge. But it would be a challenge that is urged from the moral, rather than
the aesthetic, point of view. In order for a challenge to the present argument to be a challenge, it must maintain that I am mistaken in claiming that
the moral point of view favors moral agency.
At any rate, Taylor himself maintains that the concept of inherent worth
is a moral one with practical moral consequences.
The assertion that an entity has inherent worth is here to be understood as entailing two moral judgments: (1) that the entity is deserving of moral concern and consideration, or, in other words, that it is
to be regarded as a moral subject, and (2) that all moral agents have a
prima facie duty to promote or preserve the entity's good as an end
in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. 38
Given this understanding of inherent worth, it seems that the attempt to
determine whether some uniquely human characteristic is of supreme
instrumental value-as a means to achieving some non-moral end-is
wrongheaded. When the humanist asserts that rationality, autonomy or
moral agency are great-making properties, Taylor'S question, "Valuable to
whom and for what reason?" proves to be a red herring. 39 Taylor'S own
view trades on the moral concept of inherent worth, of which he believes
all organisms to enjoy an equal degree. If the very concept of (moral)
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inherent worth is coherent, then there is an impartial moral standpoint
from which that worth may be discerned. The humanist's claim is that
humans are more valuable simpliciter, and it seems to me that this is best
captured by the moral judgment that the world is simply a better place if it
includes moral agents. 40
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20. A distinction dimly reflecting that urged by Alvin Plantinga between
"maximal excellence" and "maximal greatness" in Nature of Necessity (Oxford:
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rights is limited to human ethics. My ensuing argument takes a course different from that of Lombardi, and so I cheerfully leave this discussion.
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suggestions of David Werther, Bill Wade and D. J. Dycus.

